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Abstract
It is well known that complete prior ignorance is not compatible with
learning, at least in a coherent theory of (epistemic) uncertainty. What is less
widely known, is that there is a state similar to full ignorance, that Walley
calls near-ignorance, that permits learning to take place. In this paper we
provide new and substantial evidence that also near-ignorance cannot be re-
ally regarded as a way out of the problem of starting statistical inference in
conditions of very weak beliefs. The key to this result is focusing on a setting
characterized by a variable of interest that is latent. We argue that such a
setting is by far the most common case in practice, and we show, for the case
of categorical latent variables (and general manifest variables) that there is
a sufficient condition that, if satisfied, prevents learning to take place under
prior near-ignorance. This condition is shown to be easily satisfied in the most
common statistical problems.
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1 Introduction
Epistemic theories of statistics are often concerned with the question of prior igno-
rance. Prior ignorance means that a subject, who is about to perform a statistical
analysis, has not any substantial belief about the underlying data-generating process.
Yet, the subject would like to exploit the available sample to draw some statistical
inference, i.e., the subject would like to use the data to learn, moving away from
the initial condition of ignorance. This situation is very important as it is often
desirable to start a statistical analysis with weak assumptions about the problem of
interest, thus trying to implement an objective-minded approach to statistics.
A fundamental question is if prior ignorance is compatible with learning. Walley
gives a negative answer for the case of his self-consistent (or coherent) theory of
statistics: he shows, in a very general sense, that vacuous prior beliefs lead to
vacuous posterior beliefs, irrespective of the type and amount of observed data
[Walley (1991), Section 7.3.7]. But, at the same time, he proposes focusing on a
slighlty different state of beliefs, called near-ignorance, that does enable learning
to take place [Walley (1991), Section 4.6.9]. Loosely speaking, near-ignorant beliefs
are beliefs close but not equal to vacuous (see Section 3). The possibility to learn
under prior near-ignorance is shown, for instance, in the special case of the near-
ignorance prior defining the imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM). This is a popular
model used in the case of inference from categorical data generated by a discrete
process ([Walley (1996), Bernard (2005)]).
In this paper, we also focus on a categorical random variable X, expressing the
outcomes of a multinomial process, but we assume that such a variable is latent.
This means that we cannot observe the realizations of X, so we can learn about
it only by means of another (not necessarily categorical) variable S, related to X
in some known way. Variable S is assumed to be manifest, in the sense that its
realizations can be observed (see Section 2).
In such a setting, we introduce a condition in Section 4, related to the likelihood
of the observed data, that is shown to be sufficient to prevent learning about X
under prior near-ignorance. The condition is very general as it is developed for any
prior that models near-ignorance (not only the one used in the IDM), and for very
general kinds of relation between X and S. We show then, by simple examples,
that such a condition is easily satisfied, even in the most elementary and common
statistical problems.
In order to appreciate this result, it is important to realize that latent variables
are ubiquitous in problems of uncertainty. It can be argued, indeed, that there is a
persistent distinction between (latent) facts (e.g., health, state of economy, color of
a ball) and (manifest) observations of facts: one can regard them as being related
by a so-called observational process ; and the point is that these kinds of processes
are imperfect in practice. Observational processes are often neglected in statistics,
when their imperfection is deemed to be tiny. But a striking outcome of the present
research is that, no matter how tiny the imperfection, provided it exists, learning is
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not possible under prior near-ignorance.
In our view, the present results raise serious doubts about the possibility to adopt
a condition of prior near-ignorance in real, as opposed to idealized, applications of
statistics. As a consequence, it may make sense to consider re-focusing the research
about this subject on developing models of very weak states of belief that are,
however, stronger than near-ignorance.
2 Categorical Latent Variables
In this paper, we follow the general definition of latent and manifest variables
given by [Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004)]: a latent variable is a random vari-
able whose realizations are unobservable (hidden), while a manifest variable is a
random variable whose realizations can be directly observed. The concept of la-
tent variable is central in many sciences, like for example psychology and medicine.
[Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004)] list several fields of application and several phe-
nomena that can be modeled using latent variables, and conclude that latent variable
modeling “pervades modern mainstream statistics,” although “this omni-presence of
latent variables is commonly not recognized, perhaps because latent variables are
given different names in different literatures, such as random effects, common fac-
tors and latent classes,” or hidden variables.
But what are latent variables in practice? According to [Boorsbom et al. (2002)],
there may be different interpretations of latent variables. A latent variable can be
regarded, for example, as an unobservable random variable that exists independently
of the observation. An example is the unobservable health status of a patient that
is subject to a medical test. Another possibility is to regard a latent variable as
a product of the human mind, a construct that does not exist independent of the
observation. For example the unobservable state of the economy, often used in
economic models. In this paper, we assume the existence of a latent categorical
random variable X, with outcomes in X = {x1, . . . , xk} and unknown chances θ ∈
Θ := {θ = (θ1, . . . , θk) |
∑k
i=1 θi = 1, 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1}, without stressing any particular
interpretation.
Suppose now that our aim is to predict, after N realizations of the variable
X, the next outcome (or the next N ′ outcomes). Because the variable X is latent
and therefore unobservable by definition, the only possible way to learn something
about the probabilities of the next outcome is to observe the realizations of some
manifest variable S related, in a known way, to the (unobservable) realizations of
X. An example of known relationship between latent and manifest variables is the
following.
Example 1 We consider a binary medical diagnostic test used to assess the health
status of a patient with respect to a given disease. The accuracy of a diagnostic
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test1 is determined by two probabilities: the sensitivity of a test is the probability of
obtaining a positive result if the patient is diseased; the specificity is the probability
of obtaining a negative result if the patient is healthy. Medical tests are assumed to
be imperfect indicators of the unobservable true disease status of the patient. There-
fore, we assume that the probability of obtaining a positive result when the patient
is healthy, respectively of obtaining a negative result if the patient is diseased, are
non-zero. Suppose, to make things simpler, that the sensitivity and the specificity
of the test are known. In this example, the unobservable health status of the patient
can be considered as a binary latent variable X with values in the set {Healthy, Ill},
while the result of the test can be considered as a binary manifest variable S with
values in the set {Negative result,Positive result}. Because the sensitivity and the
specificity of the test are known, we know how X and S are related. ♦
We continue discussion about this example later on, in the light of our results,
in Example 2 of Section 4.
3 Near-Ignorance Priors
Consider a categorical random variable X with outcomes in X = {x1, . . . , xk} and
unknown chances θ ∈ Θ. Suppose that we have no relevant prior information about
θ and we are therefore in a situation of prior ignorance. How should we model our
prior beliefs in order to reflect the initial lack of knowledge?
Let us give a brief overview of this topic in the case of coherent models of uncer-
tainty, such as Bayesian probability and Walley’s theory of coherent lower previsions.
In the traditional Bayesian setting, prior beliefs are modeled using a single
prior probability distribution. The problem of defining a standard prior probabil-
ity distribution modeling a situation of prior ignorance, a so-called noninformative
prior, has been an important research topic in the last two centuries2 and, despite
the numerous contributions, it remains an open research issue, as illustrated by
[Kass and Wassermann (1996)]. See also [Hutter (2006)] for recent developments
and complementary considerations. There are many principles and properties that
are desirable to model a situation of prior ignorance and that have been used in
past research to define noninformative priors. For example Laplace’s symmetry or
indifference principle has suggested, in case of finite possibility spaces, the use of the
uniform distribution. Other principles, like for example the principle of invariance
under group transformations, the maximum entropy principle, the conjugate priors
principle, etc., have suggested the use of other noninformative priors, in particular
for continuous possibility spaces, satisfying one or more of these principles. But,
in general, it has proven to be difficult to define a standard noninformative prior
satisfying, at the same time, all the desirable principles.
1For further details about the modeling of diagnostic accuracy with latent variables see
[Yang and Becker (1997)].
2Starting from the work of Laplace at the beginning of the 19th century ([Laplace (1820)]).
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In the case of finite possibility spaces, we agree with
[De Cooman and Miranda (2006)] when they say that there are at least two
principles that should be satisfied to model a situation of prior ignorance: the sym-
metry principle and the embedding principle. The symmetry principle states that,
if we are completely ignorant a priori about θ, then we have no reason to favour one
possible outcome of X to another, and therefore our probability model on θ should
be symmetric. This principle recalls Laplace’s symmetry or indifference principle
that, in the past decades, has suggested the use of the uniform prior as standard
noninformative prior. The embedding principle states that, for each possible event
A, the probability assigned to A should not depend on the possibility space X in
which A is embedded. In particular, the probability assigned a priori to the event
A should be invariant with respect to refinements and coarsenings of X . It is easy
to show that the embedding principle is not satisfied by the uniform distribution.
How should we model our prior ignorance in order to satisfy these two principles?
[Walley (1991)] gives a compelling answer to this question: he proves3 that the
only probability model consistent with coherence and with the two principles is the
vacuous probability model, i.e., the model that assigns, for each non-trivial event A,
lower probability P(A) = 0 and upper probability P(A) = 1. It is evident that this
model cannot be expressed using a single probability distribution. It follows that,
to model properly and in a coherent way a situation of prior ignorance, we need
imprecise probabilities.4
Unfortunately, adopting the vacuous probability model for X is not a practical
solution to our initial problem, because it produces only vacuous posterior probabili-
ties. [Walley (1991)] suggests, as practical solution, the use of near-ignorance priors.
A near-ignorance prior is a large closed convex set M0 of probability distributions
for θ, very close to the vacuous probability model, which produces a priori vacuous
expectations for various functions f on Θ, i.e., such that E(f) = infθ∈Θ f(θ) and
E(f) = supθ∈Θ f(θ).
An example of near-ignorance prior that is particularly instructive is the set
of priors M0 used in the imprecise Dirichlet model (IDM). The IDM models a
situation of prior ignorance about the chances θ of a categorical random variable
X. The near-ignorance priorM0 used in the IDM consists in the set of all Dirichlet
densities p(θ) = dirs,t(θ) for a fixed s > 0 and all t ∈ T , where
dirs,t(θ) :=
Γ(s)∏k
i=1 Γ(sti)
k∏
i=1
θsti−1i , (1)
and
T := {t = (t1, . . . , tk) |
k∑
j=1
tk = 1, 0 < tj < 1}. (2)
3In Note 7, p. 526. See also Section 5.5.
4For a complementary point of view, see [Hutter (2006)].
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The particular choice of M0 in the IDM implies vacuous prior expectations for all
functions f(θ) = θN
′
i , for all N
′ ≥ 1 and all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i.e., E(θN
′
i ) = 0 and
E(θN
′
i ) = 1. Choosing N
′ = 1, we have, a priori,
P(X = xi) = E(θi) = 0, P(X = xi) = E(θi) = 1.
It follows that the particular near-ignorance prior M0 used in the IDM implies
vacuous prior probabilities for each possible outcome of the variable X. It can be
shown that this particular set of priors satisfies both the symmetry and embedding
principles.
But what is the difference between the vacuous probability model and the the
near-ignorance prior used in the IDM? In fact, although both models produce vacu-
ous prior probabilities and both models satisfy the symmetry and embedding princi-
ples, the IDM yields posterior probabilities that are not vacuous, while the vacuous
probability model produces only vacuous posterior probabilities. The answer to this
question is the reason why we use the term near-ignorance: in the IDM, although
we are completely ignorant about the possible outcomes of the variable X, we are
not completely ignorant about the chances θ, because we assume a particular class
of prior distributions, i.e., the Dirichlet distributions for a fixed value of s.
4 Limits of Learning under Prior Near-Ignorance
Consider a sequence of independent and identically distributed (IID) categorical
latent variables (Xi)i∈N with outcomes in X and unknown chances θ ∈ Θ, and a
sequence of independent manifest variables (Si)i∈N. We assume that a realization of
the manifest variable Si can be observed only after an (unobservable) realization of
the latent variable Xi and that the probability distribution of Si given Xi is known
for each i ∈ N. Furthermore, we assume Si to be independent of the chances θ of
Xi given Xi. Define the random variables X := (X1, . . . ,XN), S := (S1, . . . , SN) and
X′ := (XN+1, . . . ,XN+N ′).
We focus on the problem of predictive inference.5 Suppose that we observe a
dataset s of realizations of manifest variables S1, . . . , SN related to the (unobservable)
dataset x ∈ XN of realizations of the variables X1, . . . ,XN . Using the notation
defined above we have S = s and X = x. Our aim is to predict the outcomes of
the next N ′ variables XN+1, . . . ,XN+N ′ . In particular, given x
′ ∈ XN
′
, our aim is to
calculate P(X′ = x′ |S = s) and P(X′ = x′ |S = s). To simplify notation, when no
confusion is possible, we denote in the rest of the paper S = s with s and X′ = x′
with x′. The (in)dependence structure can be depicted graphically as follows:
✍✌
✎☞
θ ✍✌
✎☞
Xi ♥✍✌
✎☞
Si
i=1...N+N ′
✲ ✲
5For a general presentation of predictive inference see [Geisser (1993)]; for a discussion of the
imprecise probability approach to predictive inference see [Walley et al. (1999)].
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Modelling our prior ignorance about the parameters θ with a near-ignorance
prior M0 and denoting by n
′ := (n′1, . . . , n
′
k) the frequencies of the dataset x
′, we
have
P(x′ | s) = inf
p∈M0
Pp(x
′ | s) :=
= inf
p∈M0
∫
Θ
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i p(θ | s)dθ =
=: inf
p∈M0
Ep
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i | s
)
=
= E
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i | s
)
,
where, according to Bayes theorem,
p(θ | s) =
P(s | θ)p(θ)∫
Θ
P(s | θ)p(θ)dθ
,
provided that
∫
Θ
P(s | θ)p(θ)dθ 6= 0. Analogously, substituting sup to inf in (3), we
obtain
P(x′ | s) = E
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i | s
)
. (3)
The central problem now is to chooseM0 so as to be as ignorant as possible a priori
and, at the same time, to be able to learn something from the observed dataset of
manifest variables s. Theorem 1 and the following corollaries yield a first partial
solution to the above problem, stating several conditions for learning under prior
near-ignorance.
Theorem 1 Let s be given. Consider a bounded continuous function f defined on
Θ and denote with fmax the Supremum of f on Θ. If the likelihood function P(s | θ)
is strictly positive6 in each point in which f reaches its maximum value fmax and it
is continuous in an arbitrary small neighborhood of these points, and M0 is such
that a priori E(f) = fmax, then
E(f | s) = E(f) = fmax.
Many corollaries to Theorem 1 are listed in Section B of the Appendix. Here
we discuss only the most important corollary. Consider, given a dataset x′, the
particular function f(θ) =
∏k
i=1 θ
n′i
i . This function is particularly important for
6The Assumption about P(s | θ) in Theorem 1 can be substituted by the following weaker
assumption. For a given arbitrary small δ > 0, denote with Θδ the measurable set, Θδ := {θ ∈
Θ | f(θ) ≥ fmax− δ}. If P(s | θ) is such that, limδ→0 infθ∈Θδ P(s | θ) = c > 0, then Theorem 1 holds.
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predictive inference, because its lower and upper expectations correspond to the
lower and upper probabilities assigned to the dataset x′. It is easy to show that,
in this case, the minimum of f is 0 and is reached in all the points θ ∈ Θ with
θi = 0 for some i such that n
′
i > 0, while the maximum of f is reached in a single
point of Θ corresponding to the relative frequencies f ′ of the sample x′, i.e., at
f ′ =
(
n′
1
N ′
, . . . ,
n′
k
N ′
)
∈ Θ, and the maximum of f is given by
∏k
i=1
(
n′i
N ′
)n′i
. It follows
that vacuous probabilities regarding the dataset x′ are given by
P(x′) = E
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i
)
= 0,
P(x′) = E
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i
)
=
k∏
i=1
(
n′i
N ′
)n′i
.
Corollary 1 Let s be given and let P(s | θ) be a continuous strictly positive function
on Θ. Then, if M0 implies vacuous prior probabilities for a dataset x
′ ∈ XN
′
, the
predictive probabilities of x′ are vacuous also a posteriori, after having observed s,
i.e.,
P(x′ | s) = P(x′) = 0,
P(x′ | s) = P(x′) =
k∏
i=1
(
n′i
N ′
)n′i
.
In other words, Corollary 1 states a sufficient condition that prevents learning
to take place under prior near-ignorance: if the likelihood function P(s | θ) is con-
tinuous and strictly positive on Θ, then all the dataset x′ ∈ XN
′
for which M0
implies vacuous probabilities have vacuous probabilities also a posteriori, after hav-
ing observed s. It follows that, if this sufficient condition is satisfied, we cannot use
near-ignorance priors to model a state of prior ignorance for the same reason for
which, in Section 3, we have excluded the vacuous probability model: because only
vacuous posterior probabilities are produced.
The sufficient condition described above is satisfied very often in practice, as
illustrated by the following striking examples.
Example 2 Consider the medical test introduced in Example 1 and an (ideally)
infinite population of individuals. Denote with the binary variable Xi ∈ {H, I} the
health status of the i-th individual of the population and with Si ∈ {+,−} the
results of the diagnostic test applied to the same individual. We assume that the
variables in the sequence (Xi)i∈N are IID with unknown chances (θ, 1− θ), where θ
corresponds to the (unknown) proportion of diseased individuals in the population.
Denote with 1− ε1 the sensitivity and with 1− ε2 the specificity of the test. Then
it holds that
P(Si = + |Xi = H) = ε1 > 0,
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P(Si = − |Xi = I) = ε2 > 0,
where (I,H,+,−) denote (patient ill, patient healthy, test positive, test negative).
Suppose that we observe the results of the test applied to N different individuals
of the population; using our previous notation we have S = s. For each individual
we have,
P(Si = + | θ) =
=P(Si = + |Xi = I)P(Xi = I | θ)+
+P(Si = + |Xi = H)P(Xi = H | θ) =
= (1− ε2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·θ + ε1︸︷︷︸
>0
·(1− θ) > 0.
Analogously,
P(Si = − | θ) =
=P(Si = − |Xi = I)P(Xi = I | θ)+
+P(Si = − |Xi = H)P(Xi = H | θ) =
= ε2︸︷︷︸
>0
·θ + (1− ε1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·(1− θ) > 0.
Denote with ns the number of positive tests in the observed sample s. Then, because
the variables Si are independent, we have
P(S = s | θ) = ((1− ε2) · θ + ε1 · (1− θ))
ns ·
·(ε2 · θ + (1− ε1) · (1− θ))
N−ns > 0
for each θ ∈ [0, 1] and each s ∈ XN . Therefore, according to Corollary 1, all
the predictive probabilities that, according to M0, are vacuous a priori remain
vacuous a posteriori. It follows that, if we want to avoid vacuous posterior predictive
probabilities, then we cannot model our prior knowledge (ignorance) using a near-
ignorance prior implying some vacuous prior predictive probabilities. This simple
example shows that our previous theoretical results raise serious questions about the
use of near-ignorance priors also in very simple, common, and important situations.
The situation presented in this example can be extended, in a straightfor-
ward way, to the general categorical case and has been studied, in the spe-
cial case of the near-ignorance prior used in the imprecise Dirichlet model, in
[Piatti et al. (2005)]. ♦
Example 2 focuses on discrete latent and manifest variables. In the next example,
we show that our theoretical results have important implications also in models with
discrete latent variables and continuous manifest variables.
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Example 3 Consider the sequence of IID categorical variables (Xi)i∈N with out-
comes in XN and unknown chances θ ∈ Θ. Suppose that, for each i ≥ 1, after a
realization of the latent variable Xi, we can observe a realization of a continuous
manifest variable Si. Assume that p(Si |Xi = xj) is a continuous positive probability
density, e.g., a normal N(µj , σ
2
j ) density, for each xj ∈ X . We have
p(Si | θ) =
∑
xj∈XN
p(Si |Xi = xj) · P(Xi = xj | θ) =
=
∑
xj∈XN
p(Si |Xi = xj)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·θj > 0,
because θj is positive for at least one j ∈ {1, . . . , N} and we have assumed Si to be
independent of θ given Xi. Because we have assumed (Si)i∈N to be a sequence of
independent variables, we have,
p(S = s | θ) =
N∏
i=1
p(Si = si | θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0.
Therefore, according to Corollary 1, if we model our prior knowledge using a near-
ignorance priorM0, the vacuous prior predictive probabilities implied byM0 remain
vacuous a posteriori. It follows that, if we want to avoid vacuous posterior predictive
probabilities, we cannot model our prior knowledge using a near-ignorance prior
implying some vacuous prior predictive probabilities. ♦
Examples 2 and 3 raise, in general, serious criticisms about the use of near-
ignorance priors in practical applications.
The only predictive model in the literature, of which we are aware, where a
near-ignorance prior is used successfully to obtain non-vacuous posterior predictive
probabilities is the IDM. In the next example, we explain how the IDM avoids our
theoretical limitations.
Example 4 In the IDM, we assume that the IID categorical variables (Xi)i∈N are
observable. In other words, we have Si = Xi for each i ≥ 1 and therefore the IDM
is not a latent variable model. Having observed S = X = x, we have
P(S = x | θ) = P(X = x | θ) =
k∏
i=1
θnii ,
where ni denotes the number of times that xi ∈ X has been observed in x. We have
P(X = x | θ) = 0 for all θ such that θj = 0 for at least one j such that nj > 0 and
P(X = x | θ) > 0 for all the other θ ∈ Θ, in particular for all θ in the interior of Θ.
The near-ignorance prior M0 used in the IDM consists in the set of all the
Dirichlet densities dirs,t(θ) for a fixed s > 0 and all t ∈ T , where dirs,t(θ) and T
have been defined in (1) and (2).
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The particular choice of M0 in the IDM implies, for each N
′ ≥ 1 and each
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, that
E(θN
′
i ) = 0, E(θ
N ′
i ) = 1.
Consequently, denoting with di ∈ XN
′
the dataset with n′i = N
′ and n′j = 0 for each
j 6= i, a priori we have,
P(X′ = di) = 0, P(X′ = di) = 1,
and in particular
P(X1 = xi) = 0, P(X1 = xi) = 1.
It can be shown that other prior predictive probabilities are not vacuous. For ex-
ample, for i 6= j, we have
E(θiθj) =
s
4(s+ 1)
<
1
4
= sup
θ∈Θ
θiθj .
The IDM produces, for each possible observed data set x, non-vacuous posterior
predictive probabilities for each possible future data set (see [Walley (1996)]). This
means that our previous theoretical limitations are avoided in some way. To explain
this result we consider two cases. We consider firstly an observed data set x where
we have observed at least two different outcomes. Secondly, we consider a data set
x formed exclusively by outcomes of the same type, in other words, a data set of
the type di.
In the first case we have that P(x | θ) =
∏k
j=1 θ
nj
j is equal to zero for θ = e
i
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In fact, θi = 1 implies θj = 0 for each j 6= i and there
is at least one j with nj > 0. Therefore, the assumptions of Corollaries 4 and 5
are not satisfied. And in fact the IDM produces non-vacuous posterior predictive
probabilities for each data set that, a priori, has vacuous predictive probabilities.
On the other hand, all the datasets whose prior predictive probability reaches its
maximum in a relative frequency f ∈ Θ such that P(x | f) > 0, are characterized by
non-vacuous prior predictive probabilities.
The second case yields similar results. The only difference is that P(di | θ) = θN
′
i
for a given i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. In this case P(x | ei) = 1 > 0 and in fact, according to
Corollaries 4 and 5, we obtain
P(xi |x) = P(xi) = 1,
P(X′ = di |x) = P(di) = 1,
and consequently, for each j 6= i and each y 6= di,
P(xj |x) = P(xj) = 0,
P(X′ = y |x) = P(y) = 0.
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But, on the other hand, we obtain
P(xi |x) > 0, P(X
′ = di |x) > 0,
P(xj |x) < 1, P(X
′ = y |x) < 1,
and therefore the posterior predictive probabilities are not vacuous for each possible
future data set. ♦
Yet, since the variables (Xi)i∈N are assumed to be observable, the successful
application of a near-ignorance prior in the IDM is not helpful in addressing the
doubts raised by our theoretical results about the applicability of near-ignorance
priors in situations where the variables (Xi)i∈N are latent.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have proved a sufficient condition that prevents learning about a
latent categorical variable to take place under prior near-ignorance about the data-
generating process.
The condition holds as soon as the likelihood is strictly positive (and continuous),
and so is satisfied frequently, even in the simplest settings. Taking into account that
the considered framework is very general and pervasive of statistical practice, we
regard this result as a form of substantial evidence against the possibility to use prior
near-ignorance in real statistical problems. Given that complete prior ignorance is
not compatible with learning, as it is well known, we deduce that there is little hope
to use any form of prior ignorance to do objective-minded statistical inference in
practice.
As a consequence, we suggest that future research efforts should be directed to
study and develop new forms of knowledge that are close to near-ignorance but that
do not coincide with it.
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A Technical preliminaries
In this appendix we provide some technical results that are used to prove the theo-
rems in the paper. First of all, we introduce some notation used in this appendix.
Consider a sequence of probability densities (pn)n∈N and a function f defined on a
set Θ. Then, we use the notation,
En(f) :=
∫
Θ
f(θ)pn(θ)dθ,
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Pn(Θ˜) :=
∫
eΘ
pn(θ)dθ, Θ˜ ⊆ Θ.
In addition, for a given probability density p on Θ,
Ep(f) :=
∫
Θ
f(θ)p(θ)dθ,
Pp(Θ˜) :=
∫
eΘ
p(θ)dθ, Θ˜ ⊆ Θ.
Finally, with → we denote limn→∞.
Theorem 2 Let Θ ⊂ Rk be the closed k-dimensional simplex and let (pn)n∈N be
a sequence of probability densities defined on Θ w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure. Let
f ≥ 0 be a bounded continuous function on Θ and denote with fmax the supremum
of f on Θ. For this function define the measurable sets
Θδ = {θ ∈ Θ | f(θ) ≥ fmax − δ}. (4)
Assume that (pn)n∈N concentrates on a maximum of f for n→∞, in the sense that
En(f)→ fmax, (5)
then, for all δ > 0, it holds
Pn(Θδ)→ 1.
Theorem 3 Let L(θ) ≥ 0 be a bounded measurable function with
lim
δ→0
inf
θ∈Θδ
L(θ) =: c > 0, (6)
under the same assumptions of Theorem 2. Then
En(Lf)
En(L)
=
∫
Θ
f(θ)L(θ)pn(θ)dθ∫
Θ
L(θ)pn(θ)dθ
→ fmax. (7)
Remark 1 If f has a unique maximum in θ = θ0 and L is a function, continuous in
an arbitrary small neighborhood of θ = θ0, such that L(θ0) > 0, then (6) is satisfied.
B Corollaries to Theorem 1
The following Corollaries to Theorem 1 are necessary to prove Corollary 1, and are
useful to understand more deeply the limiting results implied by the use of near-
ignorance priors with latent variables.
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Corollary 2 Let x′ and s be given. Denote with f ′ :=
(
n′
1
N ′
, . . . ,
n′
k
N ′
)
∈ Θ the vector
of relative frequencies of the dataset x′. If P(s | θ) is continuous in an arbitrary small
neighborhood of θ = f ′, P(s | f ′) > 0 and M0 is such that
P(x′) = sup
θ∈Θ
(
k∏
i=1
θ
n′i
i
)
=
k∏
i=1
(
n′i
N ′
)n′i
,
then
P(x′ | s) = P(x′).
Corollary 3 Let x′ and s be given. If P(s | θ) > 0 for each θ ∈ Θ with θi = 0 for at
least one i with n′i > 0, and M0 is such that P(x
′) = 0, it follows that
P(x′ | s) = P(x′) = 0.
Corollary 4 Let s be given. Consider an arbitrary xi ∈ X and denote with e
i the
particular vector of chances with θi = 1 and θj = 0 for each j 6= i. Suppose that M0
is such that, a priori, P(X1 = xi) := E(θi) = 1. Then, if P(s | e
i) > 0 and P(s | θ) is
continuous in a neighborhood of θ = ei, we have
P(XN+1 = xi | s) = P(X1 = xi) = 1, (8)
and consequently,
P(XN+1 = xj | s) = P(Xj = xi) = 0, (9)
for each j 6= i.
Corollary 5 Let s and N ′ be given and consider an arbitrary xi ∈ X . Suppose that
M0 is such that, a priori, P(X1 = xi) := E(θi) = 1. Denote with d
i ∈ XN
′
the data
set with ni = N
′ and nj = 0 for each j 6= i. Then, if P(s | e
i) > 0 and P(s | θ) is
continuous in a neighborhood of θ = ei, we have
P(X′ = di | s) = 1,
and consequently,
P(X′ = y | s) = 0,
for each y 6= di.
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